


AIRPROX REPORT No 2019281

Date: 14 Sep 2019 Time: 1209Z Position: 5019N 00510W Location: Perranporth

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	PA28	Aviat Husky
Operator	Civ FW	Civ FW
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	AGCS	Listening Out
Provider	Perranporth	Perranporth
Altitude/FL	1300ft	1100ft
Transponder	A, C, S	A, C, S
Reported		
Colours	White	NR
Lighting	Strobe, Landing	Strobe, Landing
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	15km	10km
Altitude/FL	1300ft	1100ft
Altimeter	QNH (1032hPa)	QNH
Heading	270°	020°
Speed	100kt	95kt
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	Not fitted
Separation		
Reported	200ft V/100m H	100-200ft V/ 300m H
Recorded	200ft V/<0.1nm	



THE PA28 PILOT reports that whilst conducting circuit training with a pre-solo student, he overheard the other aircraft call on the Perranporth frequency that he was airborne from Porthtowan and routing along the coast. He was crosswind, climbing at the time, and he immediately informed the other pilot that he was flying RW09 left-hand circuit, circuits out over the sea, and that they were crosswind turning downwind. As they levelled off downwind, he saw the subject aircraft heading towards them, slightly below. As the other pilot saw the PA28, they turned slightly inside the circuit to avoid. The PA28 instructor told the student to maintain heading and level, (1300ft on QNH, 1000ft AAL). He further informed the other pilot that they were infringing the circuit, flying the wrong way and the response was 'well, we did call you on the radio'. There was another aircraft behind them in the circuit. He then completed the flight with the student handling the added stress very well. If this had been a solo student then the outcome might have been very different. Perranporth no longer has an ATZ but is marked as both a Parachute drop zone and a gliding site. No parachutes were airborne at the time but the zone was activated by NOTAM.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE HUSKY PILOT reports that he was listening out on Perranporth's radio, which was not manned at the time. He saw the PA28 about 1.5nm away and made a gentle right turn to ensure he passed behind and below it. He provided a screenshot of his navigation tool (Figure 1).



Figure 1

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'None'.

Factual Background

The weather at Newquay was recorded as follows:

METAR EGHQ 141150Z 15009KT 130V190 CAVOK 19/10 Q1032=

Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat

The PA28 and Husky pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard¹. An aircraft operated on or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft in operation².

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a PA28 and a Husky flew into proximity at 1209hrs on Saturday 14th September 2019. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC, neither were in receipt of an ATS.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from the pilots of both aircraft and radar photographs/video recordings. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

Due to the exceptional circumstances presented by the coronavirus pandemic, this incident was assessed as part of a 'virtual' UK Airprox Board meeting where members provided a combination of

¹ SERA.3205 Proximity.

² SERA.3225 Operation on and in the Vicinity of an Aerodrome.

written contributions and dial-in/VTC comments. Although not all Board members were present for the entirety of the meeting and, as a result, the usual wide-ranging discussions involving all Board members were more limited, sufficient engagement was achieved to enable a formal assessment to be agreed along with the following associated comments.

The Board first looked at the actions of the Husky pilot. He was lifting from a nearby airfield and had sensibly made a call to Perranporth to inform traffic on their frequency of his intention to route past. However, on hearing the call from the PA28 pilot that the circuit was active, he was then required to conform with or remain clear of the pattern of traffic formed by the PA28 and other aircraft at Perranporth (**CF1, CF3**). Members quickly agreed that he should therefore have acted much earlier on his situational awareness that the circuit was active and should have adapted his plan so that he remained well clear of Perranporth, either laterally or by climbing above (**CF2, CF4**). Although he was visual with the PA28 as he flew into conflict with it, and ultimately took action to remain clear of it, members also agreed that his decision to turn right, towards the airfield, was ill-advised in that it had the potential to put him further into conflict with other circuit traffic (**CF5, CF6**).

For his part, the Board agreed that the PA28 pilot could have done little more to have prevented the Airprox. He had made his presence and intentions known on the RT and could justifiably have assumed that the Husky pilot would remain clear of the circuit pattern as a result. Fortunately, he saw the Husky in good time to be able to monitor its progress and ensure that his student maintained adequate separation as the 2 aircraft converged.

In determining the risk, members quickly agreed that although the encounter had been far from ideal, both pilots had been visual with each other and so there had been no risk of collision. Ultimately, the Husky pilot took action by turning right and the PA28 instructor would have been able to take further avoiding action should it have been required. Therefore, notwithstanding the undesirable nature of the Husky pilot's routing, it was agreed that timely and effective action had been taken by both pilots to avoid the risk of collision between the 2 aircraft; risk Category C.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2019281		
CF	Factor	Description	Amplification
	Flight Elements		
	• Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance		
1	Human Factors	• Flight Crew ATM Procedure Deviation	Regulations/procedures not complied with
	• Tactical Planning and Execution		
2	Human Factors	• Insufficient Decision/Plan	Inadequate plan adaption
3	Human Factors	• Aircraft Navigation	Did not avoid/conform with the pattern of traffic already formed
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action		
4	Human Factors	• Lack of Action	Pilot flew into conflict despite Situational Awareness
	• See and Avoid		
5	Human Factors	• Perception of Visual Information	Pilot perceived there was no conflict
6	Human Factors	• Lack of Action	Pilot flew into conflict

Degree of Risk: C.

Safety Barrier Assessment³

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Flight Elements:

Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because the Husky pilot did not avoid the pattern of traffic at Perranporth.

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **ineffective** because the Husky pilot could have planned to avoid the circuit at Perranporth completely.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because having called on the frequency, the Husky pilot knew that the circuit was active, but he still flew through it.

		Airprox Barrier Assessment: 2019281		Outside Controlled Airspace					
				Effectiveness					
				Barrier Weighting					
				0%	5%	10%	15%	20%	
		Barrier	Provision	Application					
Ground Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance	●	●						
	Manning & Equipment	●	●						
	Situational Awareness of the Confliction & Action	●	●						
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance	●	●						
Flight Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance	●	⊗						
	Tactical Planning and Execution	●	⊗						
	Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft & Action	●	⊗						
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance	●	●						
	See & Avoid	●	●						
Key:		Full	Partial	None	Not Present/Not Assessable	Not Used			
Provision	●	●	⊗	●					
Application	●	●	⊗	●	○				
Effectiveness	■	■	■	■	■				

³ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).